The opening in Kashmir

The Congress party has done something unusual. It has not only agreed to share power with another party in a coalition with a properly negotiated agenda -- which is uncharacteristic enough. It has even handed over the leadership of the alliance in Jammu and Kashmir to the smaller People's Democratic Party for the first half of the six-year term. This is something the Congress' normal instincts militate against, geared as these are to the loaves and fishes of office -- and to control, sometimes by questionable means.

The maturity, and one might generously say, grace, with which the Congress has acted in the larger interests of Kashmir and of India considerably mitigates the damage caused by the bickering and jockeying for power, which delayed government formation in J&K for a fortnight. It also conveys to the larger public the seriousness with which the Indian political system can sometimes respond to certain issues. This will have a lasting positive impact in J&K.

There is just no doubt that the deal reached between the Congress, PDP, Democratic People's Front led by Mr Yusuf Tarigami, and Mr Bhim Singh's Panthers' Party, falls in the same class as the Rajiv Gandhi-Sant Longowal (Punjab) Accord of 1985, or the Mizoram and Assam agreements of the same vintage. Each of these had the potential to bring about a political breakthrough in a situation fraught with great social turmoil, administrative chaos, popular alienation and militant violence. Each offers lessons on what is needed, besides an initial accord, to complete the breakthrough.

The central issue in J&K is how to convert today's historic opportunity into real, solid, enduring gains. This needs a three-pronged approach: roll back the damage wreaked by 13 years of violence; lay the foundations for responsible governance and for restoring the people's faith in democracy so as to win their hearts and minds; and engage the larger world on the J&K issue to start the process of bringing about its peaceful settlement. Only an integrated strategy will work in today's situation.

The 31-point Common Minimum Programme of J&K's new alliance represents the broad outline of the domestic component of such an approach. This must be supplemented by an external component, including dialogue and reconciliation with Pakistan. The onus here falls squarely upon the Centre. The Centre also holds the key to the success of what Mr Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's government attempts by way of reconciliation. This means that India's national leadership must seriously reconceptualise its entire understanding of Kashmir and radically rethink the strategy followed hitherto.

It must also look carefully at J&K's latest electoral verdict. This was fractured, but nevertheless a resounding rejection of the National Conference, and in the Jammu region, of the BJP. The National Conference was severely punished for its thoroughly opportunist national-level alliance with the communal BJP, its monumental corruption, is betrayal of its own "autonomy" platform, and its colossal unresponsiveness to people's basic needs. The BJP was virtually wiped out from the Jammu region, which it had recently penetrated in a big way. (The one seat it won was a vote against Mr Ajatshatru Singh). The verdict was overwhelmingly against regional and religious chauvinism, and the Centre's Kashmir policy, of which the NC was seen as a loyal, uncritical representative.

It would be mistaken to regard the verdict as an endorsement of New Delhi's "anti-terrorist" measures, or of J&K's categorical "integration" with the Indian "mainstream". More than anything else, the Kashmiris showed a strong urge to return to more peaceful, less violent, life, with restitution of human rights and the rule of law. They also voted for an unconditional dialogue with all shades of opinion, scrapping of draconian laws, including POTA, and release of prisoners languishing in jail under them.

Going by a number of opinion polls and field reports, including this writer's recent one-week-long visit to J&K, the Kashmiris regarded this as the most credible and fair election since 1977. Yet, they voted without prejudice to their views about a long-term Kashmir solution. The aim -- especially in rural Kashmir (55 percent turnout) -- was to create an administration more alive to their immediate needs related to water, jobs, roads and hostels.

The success of the elections, with their fair (if not entirely free) character, does not mean that the "Kashmir problem" has gone away, popular alienation has ended, or that there is disgust with the separatist cause and overwhelming support for India. It only means the problem has acquired a different, less malign, more manageable, shape. The common minimum programme rightly recognises this.

Seventeen of its 31 points are measures to restore peace and promote development. Some of its components will be widely cheered in J&K: putting POTA on hold, rehabilitation of families affected by violence, review of cases of prisoners "not charged with serious crimes", establishment of an ehtisab institution to enforce accountability, and abolition of the dreaded Special Task Force-Special Operations Group of ruthless former militants and its "assimilation" into the regular police.

Implicit in the promise to heal "emotional wounds" is the common minimum programme's acknowledgement that such wounds were indeed inflicted upon the people by misguided hawkish central government policies which involved cheating on India's own Constitution, rigging election after election, imposing unpopular, unrepresentative governments on J&K, with large-scale violation of human rights and resort to civilians' harassment, including arbitrary detention, torture and disappearances. These wounds will take long to heal, but the process must begin with a demonstration of good faith and genuine empathy for the people.

The common minimum programme is in some respects conservative and cautious -- perhaps reflecting the Congress' sense of vulnerability to the BJP's criticism that it is "compromising" with pro-azadi opinion. For instance, in place of demanding an unconditional dialogue with all currents of opinion, as promised by Ms Sonia Gandhi in her campaign meetings, it limits itself to "requesting" the Centre to "initiate and hold, sincerely and seriously, wide-ranging consultations and dialogue, without conditions, with the members of the legislature and other segments of public opinion ... to evolve a broad-based consensus on restoration of peace and honour."

It drops the PDP's earlier promise of investigating allegations against the SOG/security forces relating to disappearances/custodial killings. It "balances" the promise to "reach out to" the families of "deceased militants" with the promise of relief for "families affected by militant violence". Most important, it leaves the issue of a dialogue with Pakistan entirely in the Centre's court.

Some of this caution may be in order -- if only to restrain pro-Jamaat-i-Islami elements in the PDP's support base. However, for large numbers of J&K's people, any sustainable solution to the Kashmir problem must involve Pakistan. Whether they support the Hurriyat or not -- and it has lost a good deal of credibility -- they believe that no just solution can be reached or enforced without Pakistan.

Many will be convinced of a breakthrough only when they see movement in the direction of a dialogue. That's what the international community too wants. Pressure from it will mount with de-escalation at the border and swearing-in of Mr Sayeed. It is in India's own interest to start a dialogue with Pakistan, however prolonged and tortuous -- without conceding to Pakistan any rights to Kashmir.

India's greatest asset lies in the credibility of its democratic process and the moral case against terrorist violence. There is no substitute for peaceful, patient diplomacy and engagement with the international community to restrain Pakistan from supporting terrorism in J&K.

Domestically, the litmus test will be how soon and to what extent the new government is able to end violence, both from the state and the militants, and restore the people's faith in the possibility of a modicum of justice. Here, it needs the full backing of the Centre, whose political leadership must break with worn-out clichés about "pro-active" (read, hardline) strategies. Equally crucial will be economic development, especially tackling unemployment among educated youth. Here, ironically, the Jammu region will be as important as the valley. It is in Doda, Rajouri and Poonch that the militancy's latest recruits are drafted.

For this, J&K will need an extraordinarily imaginative development plan -- not a souped up version of the "packages" the Centre announces from time to time, nor a replica of the kind of plans announced earlier for Punjab and Assam, such as setting up an Indian Institute of Technology or a big public sector project. Only a plan which takes into account the state's endowments and people's skills, and targets their needs, will work. J&K must tap the considerable resources of advocates of alternative development models and decentralised and appropriate technologies -- from all over the country.

Without such an initiative, there is every danger that the window of opportunity in J&K will slam shut -- as happened in the past in the Northeast. If on the other hand, India's leaders show wisdom and foresight, and take the people along via participatory democracy, things could change dramatically. The Indian Union's appeal to Kashmir's people will grow as they feel assured of the responsiveness and representative character of its democratic system. That's an objective well worth fighting for.

The Jammu and Kashmir election: The full coverage

Praful Bidwai